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From start to finish, Paul Ricoeur regularly defended the autonomy of
his philosophical thought vis-à-vis religious belief  in general and
speculative theology in particular. He did acknowledge, often, that his
own religious life served as a source for his philosophical thought by
providing motivation to explore particular themes and questions. Still,
he regularly maintained that his arguments and conclusions were
constructed in accord with stated philosophical methods, such that his
claims on religious themes, as on any others, would in principle be
accessible to any who chose to read his texts. Of  course, it is no surprise
that among those who engage in the academic study of  the cultural
enterprise of  religion, it has often been the theologians who have
employed his work. And it is to their credit that the theologians who
employ his ideas most typically do use him as a philosopher, whether
the phenomenologist and existentialist concerned with the human will
and action, the late-modern or post-modern theorist of  hermeneutics,
or even as simply “a philosopher of  note” whose ruminations on
traditional Judaeo-Christian and Greek texts and associated ultimate
questions offer potential insight for the theologians’ constructions. Still,
in view of  Ricoeur’s own concern about the focally philosophical nature
of  his work, it would seem that a formally philosophical investigation
of  the religious aspect of  his thought, as opposed to a theological one,
is well warranted.1
The choice of  religious experience as a topic for Ricoeur’s
contribution in the philosophy of  religion could be, however,
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controversial. First, even if  the descriptive phenomenological work of
1950’s The Voluntary and the Involuntary can be seen as concerned with
the experience of  willing, and in that sense concerned with a rather
ordinary acceptation of  the word “experience,” still the Husserlian
phenomenologist Ricoeur is after a sort of  “ideal experience,” as
opposed to particular individual and historical ones.2 And second, while
it is true that 1960’s Fallible Man has a developed sense of  the role of
“feeling” [French sentiment] as it arises in the heart, the thumos, in
consequence of  the disproportion between finite and the infinite,
Ricoeur at this point still encloses this experience within the bracketing
of  “Transcendence” that he meant to be lifted only in his projected
“poetics of  the will.”3 But third, the point for many commentators
might well be that even if  these attempts at a sort of  ideal description
of  pre-verbal and non-verbal aspects of  experience might have been
useful for the philosopher of  religion at that time, this general approach
to “experience” is precisely what Ricoeur more and more leaves behind
as he develops his ever-increasing concern with language.
These three caveats certainly seem all the more significant in
view of  the fact that Ricoeur’s next move is to the kind of  language-
and text-oriented concerns we find in 1960’s The Symbolism of  Evil and
in 1965’s Freud and Philosophy.4 In Symbolism he does affirm ancient
symbols as inherent in a kind of  archaic experience, or an archaic stratum
of  experience, but already his own focal concern is with the meanings
of  the later myths in which the symbols occur, and so neither with the
symbols’ original formation nor with any presumed function in current
religious experience. For that matter, in Freud and Philosophy he is so
concerned with Freud’s development of  meta-languages to speak of
how humans blend meanings and forces, how dreams and neurotic
symptoms mix logos and bios, that he pays minimal attention to the
clinical experiences that so concerned Freud.5 More important, by the
time of  The Rule of  Metaphor in 1975 and of  the studies from 1983 to
1985 in Time and Narrative,6 Ricoeur is so deeply caught up with linguistic
analysis, hermeneutics, and narrative theory that everyday human
experience not specifically mediated by written texts tends to be left
behind even when the “fullness of  language” is at issue. More specifically,
concrete humans with ordinary religious concerns simply do not appear
even to the degree they did in Symbolism of  Evil. Whether the religious
devotee be thought of  as (a)an original oral creator of  a religious symbol,
albeit a creator now forever hidden from history, or (b) a later writer
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whose imagination has re-worked earlier oral sagas and legends
containing such symbols in such fashion as to produce an entirely new
narrative form, or even (c)a later reader who appropriates such symbols
in such written narratives—any such actual religious person, with his
or her concomitant experiences, figures only in the background.7 Ricoeur
certainly never abandons his dictum that in both speech and writing
“someone says something to someone about something”—but given
his antipathy to Romantic concern with the genius of  authors, we hear
scarcely anything at all about the concrete “someones,” even those of
an ideal type.8
But there is more. It is not simply the disappearance of  the
early phenomenological description of experience and the failure of
the concrete and historical religious person to put in an appearance
that are likely to lead some of  Ricoeur’s expositors to look askance at
an essay on religious experience in Ricoeur. Some—especially among
those concerned with theology, and in particular, those who see all
(valid) religion and theology as centered on Scripture—tend to see
Ricoeur as on their side: against experience and in favor of  the text.
And then it must be admitted, finally, that Ricoeur certainly makes
statements in which he not only passes by the subject who has religious
experience but takes, or seems to take, a dim view of  the category of
“religious experience” as such, at least as a valid category for the
philosopher.9 In a typical passage, here from a 1995 interview, Ricoeur
states, “I have vigorously resisted the word ‘experience’ throughout
my career, out of  a distrust of  immediacy, effusiveness, intuitionism: I
have always favoured, on the contrary, the mediation of  language and
scripture; … .”10 That stricture, and others like it, has led many to focus
almost exclusively on the formally textual, hermeneutic, and indeed
epistemological aspects of  his thought.11
But is the writing and interpreting of  texts all there is, in
Ricoeur’s views? No—and hence the goal of  this essay: to argue that
while Ricoeur does attack various inadequate models of  religious
experience, he does acknowledge the phenomenon and maintains both
explicit and implicit positions on various questions with respect to it.
Take the following statement—from, significantly, the very same
interview. Ricoeur has been asked, “Do you think that there are particular
circumstances in which it would be possible to perceive something of
what lies beyond the language within which you say you live?” He
replies by pointing to end-of-life experiences among those suffering
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from AIDS or cancer, and states,
I have had the impression that one can observe, at that
moment, that the appeal to resources of  courage and
trust comes from farther than this or that language; it
is here that today I would reintroduce the idea of
experience … [T]here is perhaps a moment … when,
confronting death, the veils of  this language, its
limitations and codifications, are erased in order to let
something fundamental [emphasis in the original] express
itself, which perhaps then, effectively belongs to the
order of  experience … I think, however, that these
experiences are rare, perhaps similar to those lived by
the mystics. I have no experience in this sense. I have
instead been attentive to the interpretation of  texts, to
the ethical invitation, even if, beyond the duty and even
the desire to “live well,” I readily confess that there is a
call to love that comes from farther and from higher.12
This text, however its content may be interpreted in detail, makes clear
that whether Ricoeur’s “reintroduction” here of  the concept of  religious
experience should be interpreted as a retraction of  earlier statements,
or a qualification of  them, or most likely simply a discovery of  a proper
use of  a term in a way that he now has come to believe can transcend
the earlier strictures, Ricoeur can use the term “experience,” and does
characterize one type of  experience as that in which the “veils of  this
language … are erased.” True, the content of  this quote is difficult to
interpret, in view of  all we know about Ricoeur. Why put himself  in
the situation of  at least apparently moving away from the very position
he had so vigorously and ever more powerfully argued for, the position
most interpreters take as their focus, the position that the linguistic
element is inherent in human experience? That is the question I wish
to pose, as I examine and in part seek to reverse, Ricoeur’s “weighted
focus” on the linguistic over the pre-linguistic in religious experience.13
‘Religious Experience [of  God or …]’: In Lieu of  a Definition
We could try to proceed in a standard manner: to reproduce
or at least rationally reconstruct Ricoeur’s definitions for the terms
“religious” and “experience,” then for the putative referent(s) of  such
experience, then for the three in combination. But as the commentators
generally note, Ricoeur’s usual procedure is certainly not to provide us
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with stipulative definitions and then defend them, but rather to comment
on others’ work, initially remaining within the ambit of  their definitions
and methods, then gradually altering them, often in subtle ways. Here
the plurality of  his sources and his own use of  multiple avenues of
approach to all three terms is especially problematic insofar as he is
nowhere focally concerned with presenting a theory of  religious
experience. Poetically put, we face an apparent road-block with respect
to defining religion, a morass with respect to the uses of  the term
experience, only to find ourselves on a road that does not lead to Rome—
or to any other specifiable destination.
That is, so far as the initial apparent road-block with regard to
“religion” is concerned, we would have to face first Ricoeur’s general
Protestant preference for faith over religion, second his more specific
Reformed distrust of  the sacramental or mystical aspects of  religion,
and third his postmodern concern for particularity, which leads him to
deny that there is any such thing as a phenomenology of  religion in
general.14 We might try to get past this first problem by appeal to faith
as a human act,15 but then would need to admit that the second problem
would not only remain, but would do so in what would now be an
exacerbated form. That is, though Ricoeur does distrust the sacramental,
he still sees it in a tensive relation to the prophetic, a tension inhering in
the act of  faith itself.16 And even if  we could define religious faith as an
act with sufficient clarity, we would have to face the ensuing third
problem in a likewise intensified form, since it is precisely the complexity
just mentioned that provides the rationale for the insistence on the
particularity of  specific religious texts to begin with, and so of  their
referent(s)—a particularity which seems to render nugatory any attempt
at a single coherent philosophy of  religion.
So far as the morass with respect to “experience” is concerned,
the mud may lie deep. Recall the variety of  Ricoeur’s dialogue partners.
Experience meant one thing for existentialists Marcel and Jaspers—
especially in view of  the importance of  lived experience for Marcel
and limit-experience for Jaspers. Then we would need to connect Jaspers’
view to Kant’s, seeing Jaspers’ vision of  the cipher as perhaps already
entailed in Kant’s doctrine of  the thing-in-itself  (Ding an sich), or at
least in Jaspers’ development of  that concept. This line would
undoubtedly lead us in the direction of  Ricoeur’s own distinctive
development of  Kant’s notion of  a limit-idea. We might then pursue
an alternate development of  Kant in terms of  what experience meant
for Husserl, or rather in the series of  positions taken by Husserl,
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depending on which set of  brackets was or was not in play—not to
mention Ricoeur’s own hermeneutic alterations of  Husserl’s
procedures.17 Then, of  course, experience meant something else entirely
for Freud, who might refer to the experience of  the dream, the
experience of  the production of  the censored verbal dream-text, or
the experience of sharing (or not sharing) that already censored text
with the therapist. And so on.
Finally, so far as combining Ricoeur’s ways of  using the terms
into a single phrase— “religious experience”—is concerned, along with
tying that phrase to a referent, we have to deal with the fact that Ricoeur,
like Hegel, is more convinced of  the value of  the historical variations
on the theme than in assuming a concept capable at the outset of  any
stable definition. The most likely case is that Ricoeur may “fail” to give
a definition of  even so central a term as “religious experience” because
Ricoeur implicitly believes that what is in question can be defined only
in, precisely, Hegelian fashion, i.e. by a “succession of  figures,” with
the truth being found in the dialectic rather than any individual moment
thereof. One could even speculate that a reason for the parallels between
the two thinker’s procedures lies in a conviction that it is precisely the
nature of  the “referent” of  such experience that renders the succession
of  figures both inevitable and interminable.18
Since it seems to me that all the preceding, from Ricoeur’s
diffidence about importing religious convictions into philosophy, to
the linguistic turn, to the complexity of  all the terms involved, provides
at least a highly plausible set of  reasons as to why Ricoeur himself
never defined religious experience, and in view of  the enormous
difficulty of  working through the tasks just outlined, I seek right now
something less clear but perhaps richer than any definition. That is, I
am seeking a paradigm capable of  integrating the themes so far
mentioned, and to take that paradigm from Ricoeur’s own “pilgrim’s
progress”—albeit the pilgrimage of  the philosopher of  religion, not
the religious believer. I cannot provide Ricoeur’s definition of  “religious
experience” but what I can do is illuminate elements that would
contribute to a paradigm, partially delimiting that paradigm by engaging
the somewhat manageable task of  showing some of  the views that
Ricoeur’s various publications definitely exclude.
But before proceeding any further, I need to lay down further
limits of  my own. One, insofar as Ricoeur rarely journeys outside the
range of  experience reflected in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, I
will not either, although that limits the utility of  the resultant paradigm
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for constructive contemporary use. Two, I assume with Ricoeur that
the modern or postmodern philosopher need not retain, and indeed
should demythologize all literal interpretations of  pre-critical symbols,
stories, and ideas, no matter how central: e.g. that the image of  God as
personal means “that God has the capacity to initiate a movement of
personalization,” or that the resurrection of  Jesus need not be
interpreted as a material event, but as simply “the event founding the
community arising from the disappearance of  the suffering servant.”19
Third, I shall as much as possible leave aside consideration of  the
“object” of  religious experience even as Ricoeur conceives that object.
It has to be enough that Ricoeur holds that his Scriptures “name God”
as the referent who ties all the scriptural symbols and stories together,
yet finally escapes them all as well.20
The Experiential Birth of  the Symbol
As already noted, Ricoeur certainly has no interest in identifying
how a single religious symbol might function in some hypothetical
early human’s archaic, let alone originative religious experience, even by
developing some sort of  “ideal type” for such experience. Ricoeur is in
effect almost wholly concerned with the other end, with that symbol’s
later interpretation and appropriation by a modern or postmodern
reader, specifically one who encounters that symbol as already part of
a religious narrative or story, a myth, and indeed as part of  a narrative
that has already been taken up into a specific interpretive religious
tradition. Moreover, this lack of  interest in a symbol taken apart from
its incorporation into a narrative is not incidental, but programmatic—
and asking why can lead us into a helpful discussion. One route into
discussion of the question is to look at the three kinds of symbols
Ricoeur postulates, and to place them along a kind of  continuum.
The list itself  is well known. As most fully developed in Freud
and Interpretation, the three types are: the “oneiric” symbols found in
dreams, investigated by psychoanalysis, the “cosmic” symbols found
in religious narratives, investigated by the phenomenology of  religion,
and the “poetic” symbols found paradigmatically in deliberately
imaginative writing, investigated by literary criticism.21 In some of  his
earlier work, in which he speaks of  primary symbols as distinct from
the secondary symbols used in myth, Ricoeur does not really give a
clear principle for distinguishing the three types, other than that they
are investigated by different disciplines.22 Later, however, he more and
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more sees a difference between the symbol as typically more body-
bound and the metaphor as more focally linguistic, and I believe that
from this later perspective we can see that the three in fact did constitute
a sort of  continuum all along. More than that, this continuum is an
experiential continuum, and an experiential continuum relevant to the
philosophy of  religion.
What is a symbol? Ricoeur from the outset thinks of  at least
some symbols—and in time of  all true symbols, as distinct from
metaphors—as having “roots” in the natural, physical world of  space
and time, whether in our own human bodies with our inherent desires,
or in elements of  the world around us, or both. Re-arranging the
temporal order of  some of  his insights for the sake of  the point I wish
to make, we can begin with how in Freud and Philosophy Ricoeur is
particularly interested in how Freud links the unconscious life of  the
body and of  desire to the visual images of  the dream and then to the
verbal “dream text” produced by the patient to share with the therapist.23
Ricoeur notes Freud’s own emphasis on how there are no animal
instincts as such in human life, but rather only the “drives” that Freud
conceptualizes as on the border between bios and logos—which is to say,
Freud focuses on what animal instincts “become” in humans. But what
particularly fascinates Ricoeur is how Freud says that in fact we have
access to these drives only as they are brought to language, only as the
dream images are converted into the dream-text. As Ricoeur never
ceases to state, “This recourse to the archaic, the nocturnal, and the
oneiric, … is also an approach to the birthplace of  language … .”24
In this context, I believe, we should place the oneiric symbols
at one end of  a continuum whose middle holds the cosmic symbols
that Ricoeur, following Eliade and others, connects to religion, with
literary symbols at the other end. That is, with dreams we deal with
symbols whose meanings are so archaic, so shrouded by their quasi-
biological and fundamentally nonverbal origins, that one is hard pressed
to make anything of  these dream symbols at all. But with the cosmic
symbols that Ricoeur thinks provide the material for phenomenology
of  religion, it is almost as if  we can watch the symbols come to birth,
or better, read them as they do so. That is, for Ricoeur, what matters
precisely in the cosmic symbols that found religion is how the productive
imagination of  the archaic mind brings a series of  correspondences to
language.
For Ricoeur the human imagination is not primarily a
reproductive imagination, a capacity for recalling earlier visual images.
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Rather, following Kant, he sees the imagination as primarily a productive
imagination, an imagination that serves to create experience—in
individual experience, in culture generally, and in relation to religion
specifically—precisely by bringing experience to linguistic form.
Someone somewhere perceives a similarity between breath and wind,
and brings both together under a single word: spirit. Naturally, the
word comes together with an interpretation, perhaps a magical one at
the start. But that is just the point. Apart from the physical experience
of  the similarity of  the human breath to the wind in nature, and apart
from the mental experience of  the similarity being brought into language
in some linguistic form, humans would lack categories (whether
productive or unproductive categories is not at issue yet) by which to
experience the world, and so would have no human world to inhabit.
And it is in this respect Ricoeur frequently addresses all the sorts of
symbols presented by the phenomenologists of  religion of  his day: the
human skull and the roof  of  the house, the spinal column and the
pillars of  the temple, etc.25
This basic insight about the functioning of  the productive
imagination, or set of  insights about such functioning, lies behind
Ricoeur’s extended development of  the three symbols of  evil: the
experience of the stain, the experience of deviation from a path or
transgression of  a boundary, and the experience of  carrying a burden,
of  being weighed down.26 For Ricoeur, there actually is no real human
ethical and religious evil prior to the first person to come upon these
(or comparable) symbols.27 Naturally, prior to that time, persons (nascent
persons? primates-on-the-way-to-being-persons?) killed, took food from
others, gave false signals about likely future behavior, etc. It is just that
until someone experienced guilt by avowing it—which means until
someone invented the category of  guilt precisely through using one or
other of  the symbols (for Ricoeur, presumably stain, which he sees as
most archaic) to express an awareness of  freedom-gone-awry, the
“behavior” could not truly have been owned as an “action.”
In other words, for Ricoeur imagination, freedom, and
language are all, as it were, “born together.”28 A being who lacked the
imagination to perceive that at some past moment there had been
another and alternate course of  action, or that at a present moment
one could and should overcome one’s denial with respect to the character
of  that past action, would never have “invented” the use of  the images
of  stain or of  deviation to convey the ethical conviction that one ought
to have taken another possible course. Someone who lacked the insight
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to see that living with someone you have lied to can be—or needs to
be—articulated as being like carrying a load of  stone all day long would
not have been capable of  conceiving of  guilt. But then, someone who
lacked the actual ability to have chosen better would never have
experienced the resultant situation as a polluted and burdensome
situation. And so on and so forth. This is why Ricoeur so emphasizes
not only the productive imagination as such but the work of  that
imagination. It is in actively constructing and suffering the world—i.e.
experiencing it— through the work of  imagination that we make it
into a human world, a world of  our “ownmost possibilities.”
With this, we are getting near to the philosophy of  religious
experience, but have not yet finished with the continuum of  the three
types of  symbols. So far Ricoeur has been speaking of  what he calls
“bound symbolism”—of symbols whose meaning is nearly dictated
by the raw material out of  which they are created, by means of  which
they come into being. With these the religious subject might tend to
feel as if  the human role were simply a passive one—more a feeling
that something important is being revealed than a feeling that the subject
is creating something.29 But that very distinction itself  would be, for
Ricoeur, the insight of  a sophisticated linguist, of  someone accustomed
to thinking of  language as produced—the insight of  someone familiar
with poetry. That would be the insight of  someone who does not take
experience, even archaic human experience, something to be merely
received or suffered, but rather as something always also actively engaged
and even created.
So yes, it is true that on finishing The Symbolism of  Evil and
Freud and Philosophy, Ricoeur more and more focused and expanded his
attention to the linguistic turn of  contemporary philosophy.30 But we
must read this not as a turn away from experience, but rather evidence
of  his original and abiding Kantian-Husserlian conviction that
experience is always actively produced. It is true that he paid less and less
attention to the somatic and even emotional aspects of  experience,
more to the linguistic ones. But we should view that as fundamentally
a turn to how we concretely create experience, including for current
purposes religious experience. As Ricoeur came to meditate on how
metaphor lay not only at the heart of  consciously poetic language but
at the heart of  language as such, he was engaging ever more deeply the
Kantian insight that categories don’t “just happen.” Rather, categories
are human constructions; they result from the human attempt to grasp
the world in productively articulate ways, or linguistically productive
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ways. So long as a metaphor is fresh, prior to being put in a dictionary,
that metaphor expresses a new insight into the world, expressed in a
new linguistic form—or at least, it might. Whether a particular metaphor
provides an insight, rather than serving as a wish-fulfilling illusion, or
whether perhaps it merely proposes a guess that in the end will leave us
as ignorant as we were before, is subject to the “conflict of
interpretations” that constitutes everyday life among the linguistically
competent—who are, ideally, poetically sensitive, ethically committed,
and—if  it is their fate or calling— religiously alert.31
The Symbol and Religious Experience
It may seem to some that this line of  thought has overmuch
“recruited” Ricoeur into the service of  a philosophy of  religion alien
to his own, but a clear look at the history of  his work would make it
clear that that has not been done at all. For example, for Ricoeur it
would have been quite appropriate to list religion as one of  the cultural
realities or activities that emerge from the cauldron in which freedom,
imagination, and language blend. Indeed, so far as Ricoeur’s own thought
was concerned, it was to a significant degree the history of  his particular
religious concern about how best to articulate his experience of  evil
and of  faith that led—along with much else— to the insights about
language. So far as evil was concerned, as an existentialist he wanted to
puzzle out the links between articulating the experience of  suffering
and the act acknowledging oneself  as responsible for some though not
all suffering, and to do so in a way that respected both the experience
of  the ordinary human and the philosophic insights into the tragic—
and the hopeful—provided by such thinkers as Kant, Jaspers, Marcel,
Heidegger, and Sartre. And so far as religion itself  was concerned, he
wanted to find out how he would be able not only to demythologize
religious claims with Bultmann, and not only to demystify them with
Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud32 but also to retain fidelity to
his religious affiliation as a Reformed Protestant and to his commitment
as a religious socialist.
The task before us at this point, then, is to gather what has
been said and work back to a theory of  religious experience. Given
what has been said about Ricoeur’s ideas on the nature of  the symbol,
and said earlier about religion and experience as Ricoeur conceives
both, is it possible to blend the three so as to present what his philosophy
of  religion has to say, or would have to say, about the nature of  religious
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experience? More specifically, given the conviction that I stated earlier,
that there is a danger in over-emphasizing the Ricoeur of  the linguistic
turn, the question becomes how to find in his work an adequate
emphasis on “religious experience” with a reasonable connection to
the sense that the phrase typically carries—at least enough to allow
further development of  his ideas in that direction. More than that, it
would be good to make sense of  Ricoeur’s apparently contradictory,
but at least ambivalent, comments about religious experience recorded
earlier in this article. And finally, it is important to make sense of  his
comments in a way that will “make sense” to (ideally) any philosopher
of religion, not just to one who might happen to share some of the
religious convictions and conceptual formulations that animated
Ricoeur’s own particular religious life.
All that can be done, I believe, but only if  we look at one
more area that Ricoeur develops, an area implicit in much that has
gone before but now requiring focal attention. Much has been said
about Ricoeur’s view of  the role language plays in the emergence of
symbols in general, and that has been appropriate. But that is not all he
considered. Surely, if  one thing is clearer than another to the man or
woman in the street, it is that religious people, when asked how they
see the world, would respond as did Shakespeare’s blinded Lear on the
heath, telling the Fool, “I see it feelingly.” But so would Ricoeur. The
question is, how will he work “feeling” into the mix with “symbol” and
“language”?
First, in “Philosophy and Religious Language,” even though
Ricoeur strongly insists that there cannot be a phenomenology of
religion in general, he does admit to a general structure of  religious
experience. He thinks that as religious persons apprehend the object
of  their belief, they are, or at least claim to be, affected by this object—
which is to say they experience “feelings.” He does not think that all
religious persons in all religions have the same feelings, but it is indeed
feeling that is the common denominator. Indeed, in that article, and
then in a series of  others, he lists a variety of  descriptive phrases provided
by previous philosophers of  religion or theologians, each arguably
applicable to large numbers of  religious persons in addition to the
philosophers who originally coined the phrases.
Specifically, in this 1974 piece he first speaks of  the feeling of
“ultimate concern” as orienting the religious person in all choices, of
the “feeling of  absolute dependence” that underscores a divine initiative,
and of  the feeling of  “unconditional trust” expressing a hope that
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finds its way in spite of  contradictions.33 In another 1974 article,
“Philosophic Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics,” he speaks of
the “ultimate care” that is the religious person’s “response.”34 In 1977’s
“Naming God” he adds “a response to a will that precedes me,” and
explicitly ties the list to “religious experience.”35 He further expands
the list in 1992’s “Experience and Language in Religious Discourse”—
wherein, note, the terms “language” and “discourse” are linked with
“experience” and “religious,” with the word “feeling” as that which ties
the others together. Here he explicitly identifies the authors of  the
phrases (Tillich, Schleiermacher, Barth and Bultmann, ) and adds (from
Rosenzweig)“the feeling of  being preceded in the order of  speech,
love, and existence,” as well as his own construction, “the feeling of
belonging to an economy of  the gift … .”36
There is more. For Ricoeur, as stated earlier, not only does the
imagination give birth to the category, language, and the symbol together,
but to freedom as well, and at the same time. Hence it is no surprise
that for Ricoeur the various forms of  “feeling” arise accompanied by
corresponding “fundamental dispositions.” He sees these “fundamental
dispositions” as all the modalities of  prayer known to religious persons,
from complaints to praise, passing through supplication and demands,
which is to say that each disposition is linked to its own “determinate
discursive act.”37 And here, again, he tries to balance the universal with
the particular. He thinks that all the properly religious dispositions are
responses to the religious object—but that the actual symbols that
enter into the feelings and dispositions vary from culture to culture
and from individual person to individual person.
Of course, it is precisely at this point that his increasing concern
for language comes to the fore. As he points out in “Experience and
Language in Religious Discourse,” “To the linguistic mediation a cultural
and a historical mediation is added, of  which the former is a mere
reflection,” adding that “This weighty fact condemns phenomenology
to run the gauntlet of  a hermeneutic, and more precisely of  a textual or
scriptural hermeneutic.”38 The point is well taken: ultimate concern no
doubt takes quite a different form for a Galatian day laborer in Paul’s
day than for a French college professor in Ricoeur’s. Still, we ought not
take the point too far. While it may be true that many, most, or even all
religious symbols have a profoundly linguistic and so a culturally specific
character, Ricoeur has already made the claim that while this linguistic
aspect of  the symbols is important, perhaps crucial for the religious
adherent, that aspect is never the whole of  the symbol, and so never
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the whole of  the experience. The symbol is rooted in bodily experience
and the common physical world in which all our experience transpires.
In that sense, and to that degree, experience extends beyond the
linguistic. And all that being so, there is really no reason that Ricoeur’s
philosophy of  religion cannot be employed to generate at least a broad
paradigm of  religious experience— at least, a paradigm setting forth a
number of  family resemblances among irreducibly historical, cultural,
and linguistic experiences.39
A Paradigm of  Religious Experience
Ricoeur’s religious person is embodied and immersed in a
culture, and is located in some particular cultural epoch of  that culture.
The believer is male or female, young or old, sanguine or melancholy,
perhaps deeply religious or perhaps only mildly so. Because we do not
know ahead of  time which of  these is true, we cannot tell ahead of
time what specific qualities her or his religious experience will entail.
Of  course, since any religion unable to provide satisfactory experience
for a sufficient number of  members will presumably have died out
prior to the scholar’s research, we can trust that one or other of  the
dominant systems available will provide something for nearly everyone,
although there may be a range of  persons best suited for a particular
religion or a particular form of  it. Most religions will offer opportunity
for ecstatic behavior to those whose body-based experience requires
or at least encourages such; most will also offer the chance to engage in
more sober activities for the others so inclined.
That said, there will be important commonalities of  experience
among adherents to a particular faith tradition. While the qualities and
intensities of  feeling will vary from person to person, there will be
some ascertainable style among the community members, in particular
when a community requires all members to adhere rather tightly to
some linguistic code with its associated practices and strictures. One
religion will tend, by the symbols and stories it presents, to lead those
within its circuit to seek signs of  salvation through the earthly prosperity
provided by a strict but provident deity. A different religion will tend
instead, by its symbols and stories, to lead to recurrent experiences of
abandoning oneself  to the orgiastic rites of  the gods and goddesses of
a fertility cult. And so on.
The symbols made available through the various Scriptures
will differ from one culture to another. Likewise, believers’ reading
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habits, which may be more literalist or more focused on free re-creation
of  the tradition within a range of  approved alternative forms, will vary
as well. Some young men and women will see visions not-very-unlike
previous visions in the tradition; some older men and women will dream
dreams they find surprising even if  the scholar finds them typical—or
the reverse. Some believers will pore over the ancient texts in which
they think to find salvation, while others will angrily declare that the
Scriptures have been betrayed. The bodily transformations will vary,
from being slain in the Spirit to sitting quietly awaiting a message at
meeting. The stories, too, will vary from accounts of  the military exploits
of  the ancestors to stories of  the healers of  those who are wounded in
the battles.
In short, Ricoeur’s philosophy of  religion, though indeed quite
as textual as commonly seen—because Ricoeur is so persuaded of the
central role of the social imagination in all affairs human—nonetheless
has all the requisites of  a plausible philosophy of  religion. It is true that
the account given here says next to nothing about many of  the
common—and valid—debates among Ricoeur’s interpreters, more
especially for the theologians among them. Indeed, a very large number
of  Ricoeur’s own most pressing religious and theological concerns have
been placed in brackets here. Next to nothing has been said about
limit-experiences, limit-expressions, or limit-concepts. Little has been
said about the object of religious experience as “other” to all that can
be circumscribed by language or, for that matter, by any determinate
element in experience at all. Nothing whatsoever has been said about
the relationship of  religious experience to time, which means that
Ricoeur’s own late 20th century focus on the temporality of  the believer
and even of  the object of  belief, let alone that of  religious traditions,
has largely been left aside. Indeed, though reference has been made to
his own writings using Jewish or Christian examples, no sustained
attention has been paid to Ricoeur’s cherished convictions about the
deity he found to circulate among—though finally also to escape—the
symbols and stories in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures to which he
“listens.”
Still, even in spite of  these omissions—in fact, I am claiming,
because of  them—a number of  important but sometimes neglected
elements in Ricoeur’s explicit and implicit philosophy of  religious
experience have been brought to the fore. Though the point was not
highlighted, his notion of  text has been shown to be more supple than
might have been expected, a notion clearly involving a social imaginary
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as much or more than an insistence on the paramount importance of
words in books. His notion of  the symbol has been retrieved from
being shoved into that corner of  the library containing the
anthropologists’ studies of  pre-modern peoples, or from being a mere
way station to narrative, or from whatever lies on the postmodern side
of  narrative, and has been shown rather to remain a vital component
in a notion of religious experience applicable to this era or any era.
We who spend our time in the academy are always tempted to
study a major author’s work for its own sake, for the pleasures of  a
particular sort of  text, or for a particular sort of  conceptual closure, or
dis-closure. Ricoeur would caution, though, that the proper goal is to
appropriate these ideas by employing them. In this case, his ideas have
been developed in such fashion as to begin to provide a framework for
philosophic dialogue about humanity’s religious experiences, experiences
that may differ widely with respect to linguistic articulation, but which
may share in at least some cases common symbolic roots as well. But
the identification of  such roots requires not only the data of  comparative
religion, but supple theories by which to organize and indeed generate
such data. In this effort, Ricoeur’s work—including that “prior” to his
“linguistic turn” - remains invaluable.
Oklahoma City University
Notes
1 The preceding observations and claims reflect, of  course, the
continuing split in philosophy itself  since the Enlightenment. At one end of
a continuum one finds thinkers who investigate Ricoeur’s philosophy of
religion for their own religious ends— with of  course some finding it well
suited to their particular religious and theological commitments, and others
inadequately supportive of  theirs. At the other end lies a group of  thinkers
whose members largely ignore his philosophy of  religion, many of  whom, to
paraphrase Richard Rorty, simply ‘do not think about God—or religion—
any more.’ Of  course, some are as intrigued by the “sacred” as by the “secular”
Ricoeur, perhaps most especially among the ethicists, as for example William
Schweiker, in his dense but insightful Mimetic Reflections: A Study in Hermeneutics,
Theology, and Ethics (New York: Fordham University Press, 1990).
A classic statement of  Ricoeur’s insistence on having his work treated
as philosophy is this: “Religious language … places itself  among the objects
of  philosophy, under the category of  the philosophy of  religion. And it is in
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this sense that I speak of  it in my essays on the philosophy of  religion of
Kant, of  Hegel, of  Rosenzeweig, and of  Levinas. My episodic discussions
concerning Karl Barth, Bultmann, Tillich, and Bonhoffer are therefore to be
situated entirely on the periphery of  my philosophical field of  investigation
of  religious thematics.” “Reply to David Stewart,” in The Philosophy of  Paul
Ricoeur. Library of  Living Philosophers, Volume 22, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago
and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995), 445-446.
2 Paul Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary,
trans. Erazim V. Kohák (Northwestern University Press, 1966; French original
in 1950). Note that as this essay traces a line of  development in Ricoeur’s
thought, I will refer to the date of  the earliest published form of  a work,
usually the French version. I actually quote, however, published English
translations and their titles, and the endnotes reflect the publication data for
these.
3 Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, rev. English trans. Charles Kelbley (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1986; Fr. original 1960).
4 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of  Evil, trans. E. Buchanan (reprint,
Boston: Beacon Press, 1969; Fr. original 1960); Freud and Philosophy: An Essay
on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1970; Fr.
original 1965).
5 It is germane, if  premature, to point out here that Ricoeur himself
later regretted paying too much attention to Freud’s theoretical constructions
and too little to his clinical work. See Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction:
Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay, trans. Kathleen Blamey
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 71.
6 In the main text I am simply following the major works: Paul
Ricoeur, The Rule of  Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin,
and John Costello (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 1977), and Time
and Narrative, 1-3, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin Blamey and David Pellauer.
(Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1984-1988; Fr. originals 1983-1985).
In fairness, it should be said that the exegetical publications in a certain sense
redress the balance; this point will be addressed shortly.
7 I stand by the statement in the main text, but it is important at the same
moment that although Ricoeur himself  does not theorize as to how a particular
reader might appropriate any particular religious text, and does not speak concretely
of  individual persons doing so, Ricoeur’s own reading of  religious texts during this
same period offers critics much more to work with here. Not only does he have a
good deal to say about the theory of appropriation and about refiguring as the
final elements in reading—his own writings on Genesis, the book of Job, the
parables, and Mark’s passion narrative, give us practical examples of  aspects of
how Ricoeur himself appropriated important Judaeo-Christian texts.
8 I am not saying Ricoeur “should” have gone that route. It is just
that Ricoeur, who by no means “lacks the equipment” by which to fix the
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traces of  speakers, as demonstrated throughout all of  Interpretation Theory
(Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), nowhere shows interest
in oral tradition even when dealing with a text so close to them as the passion
narrative of  Mark’s gospel; this “neglect” is of  course completely in line with
his aforementioned rejection of  19th Romantic hermeneutics and the 20th
century exegetical concern with the world that lies “behind” the text.
9 A theological dispute about the nature of religious beliefs lies in
the background of  many such discussions, set up in part by George Lindbeck’s
three models in The Nature of  Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). Lindbeck presents (i) the traditional
cognitive-propositional model as one in which beliefs present claims that
must be true or false; (ii) a romantic experiential-expressivist model in which
beliefs express religious feeling and so need not be taken as true or false, and
(iii) Lindbeck’s own cultural-linguistic model, derived from Wittgenstein and
Geertz, in which beliefs are akin to the grammatical rules practitioners learn
and interiorize as they play a language game—to believe is to play the game.
A debate has grown up as to whether Lindbeck and an associated
“Yale school” adequately acknowledge that the crucial theological issue is
neither what beliefs mean nor what feelings they express and/or engender,
nor even how they are acquired and employed, but whether or not the beliefs
“refer”—i.e. whether they really refer to a real God (or equivalent) existing
outside, and perhaps even against, a language game. Commentators debate
(a) whether Ricoeur ought to be located in the experiential-expressive or the
cultural-linguistic school, and (b) how that location ought to be evaluated. A
helpful overview of  many elements in the debate is Dan Stiver’s Theology after
Ricoeur: New Directions in Hermeneutical Theology (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2001), 83-87. My position is that Ricoeur ought to be seen as
straddling the line between the experiential-expressive and cultural-linguistic
approaches, in virtue of  his conviction that language is an inherent element
in human experience, but that at least some forms of  language lie on the line
between bios (and so feeling and expression) and logos (and so expression,
language and culture), and concomitantly, that religious experience straddles
a line between the nonlinguistic and the linguistic.
10 Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, 139.
11 Christophe Brabant’s “The Truth Narrated: Ricoeur on Religious
Experience,” in Divinising Experience: Essays in the History of  Religious Experience
from Origen to Ricoeur, ed. Lieven Boeve and Laurence P. Hemming, 246-269
(Leuven: Peeters, 2004), provides an example of  distrust of  “experience,”
using the quote just given. Brabant’s analysis is certainly worth study, but as
his title indicates, he strongly emphasizes the narrative element.
12 Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, 145. The French, with Ricoeur’s
original emphasis on the term “fondemental,” can be found in La Critique et
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la Conviction: Entretien avec François Azouvi et Marc de Launay (Paris: Calmann-
Lévy, Hachette Littératures,, 1995), 220.
 13 The phrase “weighted focus” is Don Ihde’s, presenting the
thought that Ricoeur typically constructs a dialectic in which one method is
favored over another, without the other being abandoned. See Don Ihde,
Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of  Paul Ricoeur (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1971), 14 ff.
14The key piece for Ricoeur’s rejection of  a universal phenomenology
of  religion is “Experience and Language in Religious Discourse,” in
Phenomenology and the “Theological Turn”: The French Debate, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky,
127-146 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000; original first delivered
in 1992), especially 129-130.
15 A key article in this regard is “Philosophy and Religious Language,”
first published in 1974 and now in Figuring the Sacred, ed. Mark Wallace
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995). He further considered faith as an “act”
in “Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics,” trans. Kathleen
Blamey, in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern Univ. Press, 1991), 98 ff. The latter article makes the important
observation that while the act faith as such is directed towards its object, the
act equally entails a self-understanding on the part of  the subject.
16 Ricoeur has a rich vocabulary for such oppositions, reminiscent
of  classic Catholic-Protestant disputes: sacrament vs. word, hierophany vs.
proclamation, mystical vs. prophetic, the presence of  the divine in nature and
fertility cult (leading to idolatry) vs. the presence of  the divine in history and
ethics, etc. A number are laid out in “Manifestation and Proclamation,” also
from 1974 and again found in Figuring the Sacred. My investigation here is
largely an appeal to recall that while Ricoeur subordinates the “manifestation”
pole of  religion (which might involve some experience of  divinity in some
form) to the “proclamation” pole (seen as putting limits on all idolatrous
claims), he does not reject the manifestation pole, but sees it taken up into a
larger dialectic. My own tendency is to work the dialectic, but to reverse the
poles.
17 David Rasmussen’s early explication of  how Ricoeur advances a
hermeneutics as the means for uncovering a Husserlian “dimension of
experience” remains helpful here. See his Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophic
Anthropology: A Constructive Interpretation of  the Thought of  Paul Ricoeur (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), 123 ff.
18 I am not aware of  any extended monograph on the development
of  Ricoeur’s concepts, or even nomenclature, for “God.” Certainly one very
helpful work in constructing such a development would be T. M. Van
Leeuwen’s chapter on “Being and Language” (68-133) in his The Surplus of
Meaning: Ontology and Eschatology in the Philosophy of  Paul Ricoeur .(Amsterdam:
Rodopi, 1981.) For that matter, his immediately preceding section on
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“Ontological Feeling,” 62-67, is germane to the whole of  this paper. An
equally helpful work is the entire first part of  Bernard Stevens’ L’Apprentissage
des Signes: Lecture de Paul Ricoeur (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1991), 27-96, in which he situates Ricoeur vis-à-vis “being” not
only with respect to Heidegger but Wittgenstein.
19 Ricoeur’s statements on such issues are usually found in verbal
interviews or responses, as for example these from “Reply to David Detmar”
in The Philosophy of  Paul Ricoeur. Library of  Living Philosophers, Volume 22, ed.
Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995), 495.
20 My reference is to “Naming God” in Figuring the Sacred: Religion,
Narrative, and Imagination, ed. Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1995); French original, 1977. Key thoughts are: “The word God says more
than the word ‘being’ because it supposes the entire context of  narratives,
prophecies, laws, wisdom writings, psalms, and so on. The referent ‘God’ is
thus intended by the convergence among all these partial discourses. … The
referent ‘God’ is also the index of  their incompleteness. It is their common
goal, which escapes each of  them” (227-8). The analysis is repeated in 1992’s
“Experience and Language in Religious Discourse,” 144.
A footnote may again help situate the background debate, this time
between more traditional theologians and a group of  postmodern theologians
or a/theologians who, over the last 25 years or more, have been renewing an
apophatic theology, at first drawing from Kierkegaard and Heidegger, more
recently from Derrida and from Emmanuel Levinas. This latter group’s
members have held that one cannot use language of  “being” at all in relation
to God, with part of  the debate the general postmodern issue as to whether
or how language refers to anything outside itself  at all. The canonical text is
perhaps Mark C. Taylor’s Erring: A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago: University
of  Chicago Press, 1984); as earlier, the issue is (a) where to locate Ricoeur and
then (b) how to evaluate that location.
21 The tri-partite division is common among Ricoeur’s writings of
the 1960s and the period just afterwards, from 1960’s Symbolism of  Evil through
1965’s Freud and Philosophy up to the third lecture of  Interpretation Theory on
“Metaphor and Symbol,” added to other original lectures when published in
1976, along with a number of  summative and corollary articles written during
the period in between.
22 In addition to the books cited, one article summarizing aspects of
Symbolism of  Evil is particularly helpful. “Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical
Reflection: I.” trans. Denis Savage, in The Conflict of  Interpretations, edited by Don
Ihde (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974, original English
translation 1962; original French 1961). Ricoeur there explicitly affirms that the
further one moves from symbols, the greater the loss of “depth.”
23 I have oversimplified to keep the presentation straightforward.
Freud, as Ricoeur perfectly well knew, found matters far more complicated.
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Since adult dreamers already know verbal language, it can be the verbal
productions within dreams that may carry primitive “imagistic” meanings,
and conversely much of  the visual material in a typical dream is often already
preconscious rather than unconscious. As Ricoeur writes more generally about
symbols: “This is precisely what makes the theory of  symbols so fascinating.
All the boundaries are blurred—between the things as well as between the
things and ourselves.” Interpretation Theory, 56. More than that, in at least some
later publications Ricoeur believes that the symbols in dreams are likely to be
the hackneyed images of  popular culture. I myself  am not yet persuaded on
the latter point, and resolution might well be important for a full theory of
religious experience. Yes, such images (and related feelings) can be hackneyed—
but they might well be authentic in the sense of  fresh to the dreamer or
religious person, and may likewise tie the individual to others who resonate
to the same image. For all the intricate detail on “drives” and their
“representatives,” see Freud and Philosophy, ch. 3, “Instinct and Idea in the
‘Papers on Metapsychology,’ 115-157, esp. 134 ff. For both Freud and
Ricoeur—and for both psychoanalysis and the philosophy of  religion —the
phenomena of  repression and of  mystification complicate affairs enormously.
24 Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of  Symbols and Philosophical
Reflection: I,” 287.
25 This brief  article cannot develop the point, but in late publications
Ricoeur links his theory of  mimesis to Kant’s understanding of  the acroam—
the category which is not determined by the understanding but rather produced
by the imagination in connection with individual, particular experience. Ricoeur
himself  develops this concept with reference to literary genres; a full theory
of  religious experience would develop it with reference to the common loci
of  religious traditions: a personal God, a heaven, that life is dukkha, etc.
26 The three are first mentioned on pp. 7-8 of  The Symbolism of  Evil,
but each subsequently receives a chapter of  its own. A more economic
presentation occurs in two articles in which Ricoeur summarized and extended
the book, namely “The Hermeneutics of  Symbols and Philosophical
Reflection I & II,” originally published in French in 1961 and 1962, now in
Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of  Interpretations, ed. Don Ihde, (Evanston, Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1974), 287-334.
27 The phrase “come upon” is not innocent; Ricoeur delights in ringing
the changes upon the Latin invenire (and its correlates in the Romance languages),
i.e. to “come upon” in its various senses of “invent,” “discover,” “arrive at,” etc.
28 John Van Den Hengel in The Home of  Meaning (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of  America, 1982), 118, glosses the point thus: “The language
of  the symbol is a special type of  language. The emergent language is language
at its point of  birth. The symbol is the moment of  the creation of  language,
the moment when language first captures its own ground.”
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29 See footnote 25 above on the acroam.
30 The choice of  verbs, “focused” and “expanded,” is deliberate.
Commentators can too easily write as if  Ricoeur “happened” to make a
“linguistic turn” sometime around 1960, perhaps in response to the general
climate in philosophy at the time. In fact, the original plan for the full Philosophy
of  the Will was already made clear in the text of  Freedom and Nature as completed
in 1948 (though not published until 1950), and even more fulsomely in the
programmatic “Methods and Tasks of  a Philosophy of  the Will” delivered in
1951, though not published until 1952. Multiple statements there make it
perfectly clear that Ricoeur from the outset intended to graft hermeneutics
onto phenomenology. We ought to view him in this area as in others as not
responding to philosophic fashion in philosophy, but rather as a participant
with many others in the creation of  such fashions.
31 The series of  statements just made presents in cursory fashion,
obviously, claims that Ricoeur developed over the entire mid-section of  his
career. The books and articles already footnoted provide material on Ricoeur’s
own publications; I simply add here that in addition to such standard works
as S. H. Clark’s Paul Ricoeur (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1990),
Don Ihde’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of  Paul Ricoeur (Evanston,
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1971), and John Van Den Hengel’s
The Home of  Meaning (op. cit.), I owe much to an article by David Pellauer, one
of  Ricoeur’s two major translators. That article is “The Symbol Gave Rise to
Thought,” originally published in 1987 but now in The Philosophy of  Paul Ricoeur.
Library of  Living Philosophers, Volume 22, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, 99-122 (Chicago
and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1995). Pellauer traces the history of  the
concept through to the date of  his writing, with some attention given to the
“everyday discourse” that precedes literary work. Pellauer also has a great
deal to say about Ricoeur’s philosophy of  religious language overall; his major
article on that topic is adverted to below.
32 Ricoeur typically mentions only Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as
the three “masters of  suspicion,” and only engages in extended writing about
the first and last; he does on occasion, however, mention Feuerbach as well,
as in 1964’s “The Language of  Faith,” now found in The Philosophy of  Paul
Ricoeur: An Anthology of  His Work, ed. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), 237.
33 Paul Ricoeur, “Philosophy and Religious Language,” 47.
34 Paul Ricoeur, “Philosophic Hermeneutics and Biblical
Hermeneutics,” 98.
35 Paul Ricoeur, “Naming God,” 218.
36 Paul Ricoeur, “Experience and Language in Religious Discourse,”
pp. 127-8.
37 Although I have taken all the preceding directly from Ricoeur’s
articles, I first found some of  it in David Pellauer’s “Paul Ricoeur and the
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Specificity of  Religious Language,” Journal of  Religion 61, no. 3 (1981): 264-
284. Pellauer there points out that Ricoeur is more concerned to differentiate
religious language from other types of  language than to differentiate religious
experience from other types of  experience, such that the emphasis for Ricoeur
is on the “determinate discursive acts.” Pellauer’s subtleties go beyond the
more summary overview I am presenting here.
38 Ricoeur, “Experience and Language in Religious Discourse,” 130.
39 Once again the article, “Experience and Language in Religious
Discourse,” proves important, precisely because while this is the article in
which Ricoeur most definitively prohibits a universal phenomenology, it is
also the piece in which he most clearly lays out the path forward: through
what he calls an “analogizing transfer” from one religion to another. See
pages 131-2; he there contrasts what he intends from the attempt of
comparative religion to work from a “placeless place.” It is no surprise that
Ricoeur finds a sympathetic imagination to be the greatest aid in this
“analogizing transfer” from the categories of  one’s own tradition to those of
another.
